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Abstract - Rights Based Management schemes have already 
been experimented in some specific fisheries and 
localizations. These experiences have a lot of teaching 
results about good practices of sustainable management 
but, also, about the limitations and risks of these tools.  
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the Portuguese 
experience with RBM. Our analysis highlights the 
participatory approach that is developed in the case of 
sardine fisheries, a proposal of management regime that is 
very interesting in the sense that it is not possible to talk 
strictly of rights to fish but, better, in “rights to manage”. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most relevant issues in the discussion of 
Common Fisheries Policy Reform is the subject of 
Rights Based Management and the feasibility of its 
introduction in the conservation and management 
regime of European fisheries, after 2012 (see, in the last 
number of this review, Coelho, Filipe & Ferreira, 2011). 
All fisheries management systems in the world 
introduced, in the last two decades, some form of use 
rights to face the problems derived from the “common 
property” nature of fisheries. The idea of creating 
markets for fishing rights as a means of internalizing the 
externalities received considerable attention by the 
researchers in Fisheries Economics. Recently, a growing 
number of scientists and decision makers in this area 
went on supporting the role of this kind of tools in the 
design of Fisheries Policy. 
The basic “format” is to create a market of 
individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and confide in the 
self-regulation of such a system to conduct the fisheries 
to the economic efficiency and to promote inter-
temporal sustainable use of resources. But there are 
other interesting possibilities of making fisheries 
management with schemes that have a rights based 
proposal in its core fundaments.  
In general, first it is needed to determine the TAC 
(total authorized capture) that guaranties the sustainable 
use of the fish stock and divide this total amount in 
several unit quotas that are distributed between the 
fishing enterprises. Then, a market for quotas can also 
be created. The objective is that, because they are the 
“real owners”, fishermen enterprises will internalize the 
effects of externalities. In the long run, the property 
rights will be driven to the most efficient agents, those 
that can allocate the resources in a perspective of 
optimal sustainable use along the time. 
Rights Based Management schemes have already 
been experienced in some specific fisheries and 
localizations. These experiences have a lot of teaching 
results about good practices of sustainable fisheries 
management and also about the limitations and risks of 
these tools. But these methods are always studied in a 
perspective that highlights the “privatization” character 
associated with this solution. Of course, this is not 
unexpected. But, even in this kind of rights 
privatization, there is the expectation that the results of 
cooperation among enterprises could perform better 
solutions in resource use, especially when realizing that 
there is the facing of a “common”, renewable, mobile 
resource. 
2.  RBM in Portuguese Fisheries 
“Fisheries” is an important sector in Portugal: 
almost 1% of gross value added. Seafood consumption 
per capita is one of the highest in Europe. 
In the context of Fisheries Policy, the use of Rights 
Based Management (RBM) schemes in the Portuguese 
fisheries is still recent. The analysis of this experience is 
a “work in progress”. An interesting study carried out 
for the European Commission by a Consortium of 
Fisheries Research Centers
1
 achieved relevant 
conclusions summarized below.  
Currently, Portugal uses three types of RBM 
systems to manage its fisheries. 
In general terms, drivers to the implementation of 
RBM systems in Portuguese fisheries have been 
conditioned by resource sustainability and fleet and 







                                                 
1  See MRAG et al (2007) 
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Table 1: Portuguese Fisheries - RBM Systems 
 An ITQ system to manage the demersal fishery in 
waters of the NAFO (North Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission), Svalbard, and NEAFC (North East 
Atlantic Fisheries Convention) and Norway. 
These are mixed fisheries developed by trawlers 
that harvest demersal stocks as cod, and other 
species as shrimp, mackerel, blue whiting, 
herring, red fish, tusk, Greenland halibut, horse 
mackerel, etc.  
 Another ITQ system utilized in the swordfish 
fishery in the areas of jurisdiction of ICCAT 
(International Commission for the Conservation 
of Atlantic Tunas); It is applied to long-liners 
fishing to the north of 5° N parallel.  
 A Community quota approach applied to POs 
(Producer Organizations) comprising coastal 
boats fishing sardine. This is an approach in 
which POs receive a ceiling of catches by the 
national authorities but have the autonomy to 
impose restrictions on the vessels number of 
fishing days and catches. 
3. ITQ Systems 
In the first experiences of RBM, those that relates 
to ITQs systems, the main instrument used to manage 
fishing effort is an annual license to fish. The authorities 
grant licenses and permits on the basis of several criteria 
and requirements: status of the stock, operating areas, 
previous year‟s catch, gear selectivity, amount of 
fishing gear per vessel, vessel‟s characteristics and 
condition. Cases of repeated failure to comply with the 
rules may be cause for retirement.   
3.1. Demersal Fisheries 
In 1992, individual quotas per vessel were allocated 
for the first time. The objective was to regulate the 
distant water fishing, especially in the NAFO areas. 
These use-rights per vessel are transferable but subject 
to prior authorization. The bundle of property rights 
considers 13 trawlers fishing in these waters.  
The fundamental problem to face is the difficult 
situation of some straddling stocks (as cod) that were 
the most focused species of this activity. Long distance 
fisheries always had a special tradition in Portuguese 
fisheries and presented perhaps the most efficient 
segment in the sector (at least, the best in terms of fleet 
modernization). 
Quotas are established annually and depend on the 
level of the TAC. The surpassing of a given vessel‟s 
quota implies the reduction of its next year‟s share by 
the amount exceeded. Initial allocation of rights was 
undertaken on historical catch records.  
Transfer of rights is allowed between boats in the 
initial census. Transfer between Portuguese boats and 
other Member States boats are allowed but only after 
permission from the Portuguese administration 
authorities.  
There is a limit on participation, which is restricted 
to boats in the group of vessels established by 
Government Decision. New entrants can only enter the 
fishery when buying a vessel from the fleet. No new 
vessels and no new licenses are allowed. However, a 
new boat may replace an old one. 
3.2. Swordfish Fisheries 
Portugal also applies an ITQ system in the 
swordfish fishery that is based on a TAC recommended 
by ICCAT.  
There are 61 vessels that participate in this 
swordfish fishery. 
The Regulament 1221-A/97 established the census 
of long-liners with rights to fish in ICCAT waters to the 
north of 5° N. The census, established in 1997, 
comprises 52 vessels with fishing rights. Up to 9 long-
liners of the census could be able to fish to the south of 
the parallel of 5º N but have to obtain a permit from the 
authorities and demonstrate navigation and security 
conditions.  These fishing rights can be withdrawn or 
modified by national or Community decision.  
Vessels that fish in the northern zone may fish in 
the southern zone but are allowed to catch swordfish 
only as an accessory catch and cannot surpass the 5% of 
the total catches per vessel. 
The initial allocation of rights was done through 
historical catch records.  
Transfer of rights is allowed only between boats in 
the long-line fleet. Limits on participation are restricted 
to boats in the original census. Transfer of right is 
allowed but it has to be communicated to the concerned 
authorities.  As in the previous case, new entrants can 
only access to the fishing rights by buying a vessel from 
the fleet. No new vessels, and thus no new licenses, are 
allowed, but a new boat may replace an old one.  
Note that no other Member States have access to 
the fishing rights distributed by Portugal under this 
RBM system. 
The evaluation that can be made about the 
performance and risks of this management schemes 
leads to some significant conclusions, even if the 
research takes only at an “exploratory” level.  
The first element to highlight is that there is no 
reference to concentration of fishing rights and the 
legislation does not make any special provision to avoid 
it. This is very interesting because it relates the most 
usual and important limitation that is appointed to this 
type of regulation methods: the possible concentration 
of property. In fact, a strong market power in a few 
hands of enterprises will lead to economic inefficiency. 
Second, ITQs in demersal fisheries may have an 
impact on discards, but information is not yet available. 
It must be noted that separating the effects of discards 
from this approach could be difficult in a trawling 
fishery because by-catch is an issue closely related to 
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the trawling technology, especially in cases of mixed 
fisheries. Discarding of non-targeted species shall exist 
regardless of the rights based regime system.  
In spite of this, everyone recognizes that the issue 
of individualization of quotas (allocation to individual 
fishermen) may exacerbate high grading and, in the 
absence of strong regulations to deter discarding, there 
may be an incentive for a certain level of discarding. 
But isolating and assessing the impact is a difficult issue 
to address. 
4. “Rights to Manage” in Sardine fisheries 
The third situation described in the table is very 
interesting in the sense that it is not correct to talk 
strictly of rights to fish but instead, better, in “rights to 
manage”. 
Sardine is the main Portuguese species in terms of 
catch (36% of total landings). 
The participatory approach that is applied to the 
case of sardine fishery involves 151 purse seiners.  
In the past few years, this participatory approach to 
resource management has allowed national authorities 
and Producers Organizations to ensure the control and 
surveillance of the sardine fishery.  
An important attention is given to the status of the 
stock and its capacity of recovery. Sardine is managed 
under an „Action Plan” that aims at wider protection of 
juveniles and regulates harvesting and marketing. The 
measures adopted include restrictions on catches, catch 
handling and marketing. They also include annual 
restrictions on fishing effort and on the volume of 
landings by group of vessels in each PO.  
The „Action Plan for Sardine‟ takes technical 
restrictions that set up restrictions on the sardine 
fisheries. These regulations establish the limit of days to 
fish sardine - 180 days per boat. Portuguese authorities 
impose catch ceilings on POs based on scientific 
recommendations but can also grant rights to POs that 
are consequently empowered to impose restrictions 
(daily catch limits) to fishing boats. 
POs receive a catch allocation from the Fisheries 
Administration and then divide it among its vessels. 
What is interesting is that the cooperation among POs 
(for example, in the Peniche area) has a significant role 
in the process of defining certain rules and fishing 
restrictions that may also surpass the proposed 
government measures, with the objective of better 
recovery of the stocks.  
In the case of Peniche (Peniche is the Portuguese 
most important port of sardine landings), see Filipe, 
Ferreira & Coelho (2008) about the role of the two most 
important Producers Organizations – 
FENACOOPESCAS & OPCENTRO 
Rights are allocated to POs permanently. Vessels 
can be transferred from one PO to another but the catch 
ceiling set up for the PO receiving the new boat may not 
be surpassed. This may lead to revision of the PO catch 
allocation. 
Initially rights were allocated to POs by authorities 
on a historical harvest record basis. Newcomers are 
permitted to enter when buying a vessel. This is a 
coastal fishing activity. Therefore there is no access to 
nationals of other States member of EU. 
In the case of sardine fisheries, the rights to manage 
can be seen as common pool rights for the members of 
the PO, thus concentration does not take place among 
the members. 
There are some issues that relate the eventual 
capacity /necessity of protection of small- scale fisheries 
in the coastal areas. In fact, small purse seiners (< 50 
GRT) also participate in the fisheries thus holding a 
right to access the resource. However, particular 
protective measures for small-scale are not found. 
Effects on discards were not identified.  As a 
fishery based on a small pelagic species, it is not 
expected to have acute discard problems. Moreover, the 
cooperation between the players in the game of such a 
participatory and community based approach may 
discourage discards and other undesirable behavior. 
5. Conclusions 
There is also a huge space for researching the 
impacts of a more extensive application of Rights Based 
Management to the European Fisheries. 
The evaluation of Portuguese experience is 
interesting because it leads to the analysis of the impacts 
of different proposals of RBM schemes.  
In particular, it seems very interesting (and 
deserving a more profound analysis) the case of sardine 
fisheries. The participatory approach to the proposed 
resource management is especially relevant because it 
introduces the possibility of “rights to manage” rather 
than rights to fish and puts another expectation on the 
issue of cooperation among partners.  
With this approach it seems that a situation close to 
a “res communes” regime is being faced, in the sense of 
Bromley: the true “common property”, with a group of 
co-owners, perfectly defined, that manage the resource. 
The key words of such a proposal are “Co-
Management”, Self-regulation and Cooperation.  
In all the three cases summarized, there are 
important issues relating the social problems and the 
form they are faced in each of these approaches. The 
fundamental issue of rent distribution is not yet well 
documented and evaluated. But, of course, it is referred 
in all the interviews with the agents: fishermen, owners 
of the vessels, fishermen families, and coastal area 
authorities. It is an important area of future research.   
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